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ognition of human rights; moving 
from the policy of non-interference 
to non-indifference so the African 
Union had the right to intervene; 
and creating a regional peacekeep-
ing force. In this essay, I seek to an-
swer the question of whether or not 
the AU accomplished its mission of 
establishing the principle of non-in-
difference and holding its mem-
bers to a higher standard of human 
rights, through four case studies.
Scope, Relevance, and Defi-
nitions 
     Human rights in Africa have in-
creasingly come into international 
attention in recent decades, as po-
litical instability, economic troubles, 
and climate/war refugee crises have 
plagued many countries. In this es-
say, I will cover 1963 to the present, 
but focus specifically on case stud-
ies emerging in the post-Cold War 
and early 2000s years, as the OAU 
was replaced by the African Union. 
While there is generally an interna-
tionally inclusive definition of hu-
man rights (this essay defines hu-
man rights as the ones listed in the 
UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights), there is the less-un-
derstood challenge of defining hu-
man rights protections The United 
Nations leans on a combination of 
peacekeeping missions, internation-
al military intervention, treaty bod-
ies and councils, R2P (responsibility 
to protect,) and UN bodies such as 
the UN Security Council.1 The Af-
rican Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), estab-
lished in the 1981 African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and 
One of the most striking features of contemporary African history is how of-
ten actors have committed human 
rights abuses against people across 
national borders. This paper seeks to 
compare the effectiveness of the Or-
ganization of African Unity (OAU), 
and its successor, the African Union 
(AU), in protecting human rights on 
the continent. I hypothesize that the 
OAU, already weakened by internal 
Cold War divisions, was ill-adapt-
ed to the challenges and conflicts 
of the last half of the 20th century. 
Throughout its existence, the OAU 
failed to encourage better gover-
nance and stand up against human 
rights abuses. The AU was con-
sciously better structured to inter-
vene in human rights abuses, which 
it did in three key ways: explicit rec-
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also known as the Banjul Charter, 
defines human rights protections 
far more vaguely, focusing on the 
legality of human rights issues and 
research.2 The ACHPR has three hu-
man rights monitoring procedures: 
the state-reporting procedure, the 
inter-state complaints procedure, 
and the individual complaints pro-
cedure.3 
     Due to the overlapping and con-
fusing agreements on what pro-
tections look like,this essay only 
focuses on evaluating the effective-
ness of the OAU and AU’s usage of 
international intervention in cases 
where poor governance met human 
rights abuses. Additionally, I ask 
the reader to consider how most of 
the states on the continent are part 
of the OAU and African Union, so 
membership alone cannot account 
for the variation in human rights 
protection. This paper will primari-
ly pull from case studies throughout 
the given time period. 
Historical Timeline and 
Topic Background
     Since its conception in 1963, the 
OAU has been consistently involved 
in the human rights struggle, as 
demonstrated by “the struggle for 
the decolonisation of Africa and the 
right to self-determination and in-
dependence.” However, it was only 
after transitioning into the African 
Union that not only were human 
rights made into an explicit part of its 
charter, but protections were actual-
ly integrated into its regular practic-
es.4 With the exception of Morocco, 
which withdrew for 32 years before 
rejoining, the OAU/AU has consis-
tently maintained continent-wide 
membership. The OAU aimed to 
promote unity, accelerate liberation 
from colonial rule, and help states 
achieve economic success indepen-
dent of their former colonial rulers. 
Because of how fresh independence 
movements and colonialism were 
in the African consciousness when 
the OAU was created, the organiza-
tion emphasized state sovereignty 
and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs, and had little enforcement 
capacity to carry out its goals. In 
terms of human rights in particular, 
these characteristics hindered OAU 
intervention, as the majority of con-
flict on the African continent is not 
interstate conflict, but intrastate 
conflict (e.g. civil wars and conflicts 
involving non-state actors).5
     The African Union was an at-
tempt to better serve the needs of a 
decolonized Africa. Its restructur-
ing sought to solve many of the en-
forcement issues of the OAU and to 
grant the organization more power, 
following the precedent of the sim-
ilar European Union. The African 
Union’s strong emphasis on human 
rights, and the bodies it has created 
to protect them, has coincided with 
the use and growth of international 
involvement in peacekeeping. How-
ever, the African Union has much 
work to do, if it is to accomplish its 
ambitious goals of protecting hu-
man rights across the continent. 
The OAU
     Very quickly after its creation, the 
Banjul Charter seemed like an in-
adequate basis for action, especial-
ly with only the tools of weak and 
insecure state governments. There 
was also the economic weakness of 
many African states (i.e. they could 
not contribute funding resources 
to multilateral organizations), and 
thus the OAU through its operat-
ing years, which limited its enforce-
ment. But ultimately, the nail in the 
coffin was the principle of non-in-
tervention, contrasting directly with 
the African Union’s principle of 
non-indifference. The case studies I 
will look at here are the Biafran War 
and the Uganda-TanzaniaWar.
The OAU in the Nigerian Civil 
War/Biafran War (1967-70) 
     The Biafran War was a civil war 
that attempted to stop the secession 
of the Biafran region, which was 
populated mostly by Igbo people 
and contains the lucrative, oil-pro-
ducing region of the Niger Delta. 
The Biafran Conflict was the OAU’s 
first true management crisis. The 
conflict was complicated by how in-
vested more powerful non-African 
actors (such as the United States, 
Soviet Union, etc.) were, due to 
the issue of resource access and the 
fact that the Biafran War was a civil 
war.6 The first mistake of the OAU 
was to initially dismiss the deteri-
orating situation in Nigeria. Then, 
when the organization caved in to 
international pressure to start peace 
talks, it only brought in the federal 
government of Nigeria. Scholars at 
the time recognized the incompe-
tency of these efforts, and “it is with 
the same naivete and ineptness that 
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the OAU approached other African 
conflicts.”7
     Because the OAU was unable 
to enforce its decision to support 
Nigeria as an anti-secessionist or-
ganization, the Nigerian situation 
divided Africa between states that 
recognized Biafra and those that did 
not, which demonstrated its weak-
ness to the continent as well as to 
the outside world. Nigeria thus be-
came an “open field for unilateral 
third-party intervention by extra 
Africa[n] states.”8 This blanket sup-
port became tacit permission for the 
enormous human rights violations 
committed in Biafra, with estimates 
ranging from 500,000 to 6 mil-
lion wartime casualties, as well as a 
million total deaths due to starva-
tion and disease.9 Indeed, the OAU 
passed a resolution formally con-
demning secession, and refused Ni-
geria-Biafra diplomatic mediation 
by not allowing Biafra an audience 
with the OAU. In direct contrast, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat (United 
Kingdom) began peace talks with 
both sides to begin finding a diplo-
matic solution.10 While these were 
also ultimately unsuccessful, the 
Commonwealth made more prog-
ress in conflict management than 
the OAU, yet again undermining its 
efficacy. Albeit at this time the OAU 
was extremely new, but it was clear 
that the OAU did not necessarily 
have a vested interest in protect-
ing human rights — it first failed to 
criticize the Nigerian blockade that 
was causing the food shortages, and 
then dragged its feet in completing 
negotiations.11 The consultative sta-
tus of the OAU reflects the view that 
this was a domestic dispute, rather 
than one that concerned most Afri-
can nations. 
The OAU in the Uganda-Tanza-
nia War (1978-79) 
     Relations between Tanzania and 
Uganda were tense, due to Ugandan 
President Idi Amin’s coup of Mil-
ton Obote and Tanzanian President 
Julius Nyerere’s support of Obote. 
Both Tanzania and Uganda were in 
violation of OAU’s non-interference 
principle — Tanzania for invading 
and overthrowing Amin, Uganda 
for annexing Tanzanian territory 
— but Amin was notorious for his 
human rights abuses. His adminis-
tration actively committed political 
repression and extrajudicial killings, 
and the death toll during his years 
in power is estimated to be between 
80,000 and 500,000.12 Interestingly, 
the Uganda-Tanzania War lacks the 
Cold War dimension that compli-
cated many African conflicts. 
     First, we must address why the 
OAU did not intervene or even dis-
cuss Amin’s brutality, even when 
the Uganda-Tanzania War began. 
Indeed, the OAU summit was host-
ed in Kampala in 1975, the same 
year Amin became chairman of the 
OAU. Only after the 1975 summit 
did concerns around Amin’s chair-
manship begin to develop, and yet 
there was no active conceptualiza-
tion of the human rights violations 
occurring.13 In the conflict, despite 
the extraterritorial actions of both 
nations and the blatant disregard 
of OAU policies, Nyerere’s invasion 
of Uganda was quietly accepted by 
most external observers. Crucially, 
the OAU declined to formally con-
demn the Ugandan invasion, and 
Nyerere privately invoked humani-
tarian concerns, but never publicly 
linked them to Uganda’s interven-
tion, as to do so would have been 
an admission to breaking the OAU 
Charter.14 This clarifies that the 
OAU was not only turning a blind 
eye to Amin’s atrocities but de facto 
discouraging military intervention 
based on human rights. 
     The task of mediating the con-
flict fell to the OAU, but with both 
parties unwilling to negotiate diplo-
matic mediation, mediation seemed 
to stall. However, suddenly on No-
vember 14, 1978, Amin “announced 
an unconditional withdrawal and 
invited OAU observers to witness 
it.”15 Although this was claimed as 
a successful OAU effort, Amin’s 
decision in reality had more to do 
with the realization that he had little 
support — the conflict was frozen 
rather than resolved. This failure 
to broker a lasting peace spoke not 
only to the OAU’s widely acknowl-
edged impotence in resolving dis-
putes, but also to how its policy in-
stitutions were ineffectual at taking 
action and could mostly only advise 
and mediate. In the OAU’s state of 
forced neutrality and lack of exec-
utive power, African nations could 
easily disregard the decisions and 
vague resolutions of the organiza-
tion. By engaging in more decisive, 
and perhaps military, intervention 
during Amin’s reign, the human ef-
fects of the Uganda-Tanzania War 
and Amin’s war crimes could have 
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been reduced, if not eliminated en-
tirely. 
The African Union
     The African Union has taken far 
more of an interventionist approach 
to stopping human rights violations, 
by developing legal frameworks and 
developing the principle of non-in-
difference, reflecting a new political 
culture that prioritizes democracy 
and intervention. I will again look at 
two case studies here, including one 
regional peacekeeping mission: the 
UN-AU Mission in Darfur and the 
Libyan Civil War. 
African Union Mission in Su-
dan (AMIS) and United Na-
tions-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID): 2004-07, 
2007-present 
     AMIS was unable to contain the 
human rights crisis in Darfur, Su-
dan for several reasons.
     UNAMID is a joint peacekeep-
ing mission that absorbed the Af-
rican Union Mission in Sudan and 
aimed to stabilize Darfur, Sudan, 
while peace talks continued. Joint 
missions are important in allow-
ing the AU to stay at the forefront 
of continental conversations on hu-
man rights, while providing more 
manpower and experience to in-
crease the capacity of intervention. 
They are also a financial necessity; 
many African states fail to pay their 
OAU dues, and the AU’s “chronic 
failure to raise enough financial and 
human resources to conduct peace-
keeping or peace support operations 
has been embarrassing to the orga-
nization.”16 The $26 million USD 
budget for the original 2004 African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
was funded entirely by international 
donors, including the UN, Europe-
an Union, and NATO, with no AU 
member states contributing to the 
funding.17 Financial instability not 
only made the presence of AMIS 
in Sudan unviable in the long-run, 
but also reduced its ability to de-
fend those in Darfur. This reduced 
ability led the AU to finally accede 
to joint UN intervention with the 
establishment of UNAMID, con-
ceding control notably to the United 
States, who played a key role in the 
recruitment of peacekeeping troops. 
By handing over control, UNAMID 
was allowed to become one of the 
largest and most expensive peace-
keeping operations ever deployed, 
with nearly 20,000 troops and staff, 
to meet the needs of Darfur.18
The Libyan Crisis (2011) 
     When the Libyan Crisis broke out 
with the Arab Spring and the oust-
ing of Gaddafi, there was hope that 
the African Union would decisive-
ly step in and create “African solu-
tions to African problems.”19 But 
not only were the African Union’s 
first half-hearted measures (includ-
ing trying to dispatch a fact-find-
ing mission) quickly overridden; 
they were eventually shut out of the 
peace-making process entirely. The 
AU also had internal disagreements 
over how to respond to Libya, fur-
ther slowing its response. The AU’s 
marginalization in responding to 
the Libyan Crisis comes partly from 
this failure to send a fact-finding 
mission, as the UN would have had 
to step back — the UN Charter rec-
ognizes the importance of regional 
arrangements, and “regional ar-
rangements are enjoined to make 
every effort to achieve pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such 
regional arrangements … before re-
ferring them to the Security Coun-
cil.”20 Subsequent UNSC resolution 
1973, authorizing the use of force 
(de facto providing the justification 
for NATO intervention), and then 
the UNSC’s refusal of the AU’s Ad 
Hoc Committee, supposedly the de-
cision-making committee of the AU 
on Libya, to meet Gaddafi, the AU 
was shut out entirely.21
      The Libyan Crisis is yet anoth-
er example of compelling enforce-
ment power, the lack of true AU 
financial commitment to regional 
peacekeeping, and aforementioned 
internal divisions. Although Gadd-
afi ignored AU demands to end the 
crisis peacefully, the AU hesitated 
to intervene or impose sanctions, 
because Libya was a key leader in 
the formation of the AU and one 
of “five countries contributing 75% 
of the AU budget.”22 An important 
disagreement was on the acceptance 
of UN and NATO intervention: 
some member states accepted UN 
intervention while disapproving of 
NATO, some opposed NATO’s op-
eration in Libya, and some support-
ed NATO. There was also disagree-
ment on how to handle Gaddafi, 
and whether or not to recognize the 
UN-implemented Libyan transi-
tional government. The AU’s road-
map for Libya was unable to reach 




However, unlike under the OAU, 
tangible steps were taken towards 
the goal of reducing human rights 
abuses and fostering peace, such as 
the creation of the AU Peace and 
Security Council, which replaced 
the OAU Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Res-
olution. However, even beyond dip-
lomatic rhetoric, the Libyan crisis 
was an embarrassment for an or-
ganization that claimed to promote 
Pan-African consensus but could 
not hold its own members account-
able to committee-wide decisions. 
     Even though the African Union 
has engaged in relatively more suc-
cessful international intervention, 
its “ambivalent, and at best muted, 
response” to humanitarian crises in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali has 
drawn criticism.23 Part of this can be 
attributed to the difficulty of reach-
ing consensus on regional peace-
keeping missions, as many African 
states have not ratified the protocol 
establishing the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, indi-
cating that governments are selec-
tive in choosing when and when not 
to intervene. Another burden is low 
organizational capacity: because the 
African Union does not have the 
manpower to engage in every in-
stance of human rights violations, 
the organization has become rela-
tively dependent on UN interven-
tion. 
Final Comparison and Con-
clusion
     After comparing the two orga-
nizations, it is clear that the OAU 
was set up to be ineffective by de-
sign, as the OAU was at its core a 
conservative, anti-secessionist, an-
ti-interventionist institution that 
affirmed state decisions selective-
ly and was able to hide behind the 
idea of state sovereignty to avoid 
actively defending human rights on 
the continent. The African Union 
has seen great success in improving 
transparency and initiative in pro-
tecting human rights, compared to 
the Organization of African Unity, 
and its public rhetoric has reflected 
this new emphasis on intervention. 
However, without achieving finan-
cial independence and raising its or-
ganizational capacities, the AU will 
be unable to shed its colonial-era 
structural limitations and transform 
into a truly modern multilateral or-
ganization that is respected and ca-
pable of swift action in Africa. Be-
cause the autonomy of the African 
state has been increasingly eroded 
by the international community, 
the limited independence translates 
to the supranational level as well, 
where the AU is constrained in its 
decision-making power and de-
pends on the United Nations. (The 
Libyan Crisis demonstrates this fi-
nancial dilemma: the lack of political 
will to impose punitive measures on 
rulers who contribute funding leads 
to a less democratic organization). 
Due to this, my earlier hypothesis 
of whether the AU does a better job 
than the OAU of protecting human 
rights abuses is only half correct — 
it’s true that the OAU certainly did 
not pay as close attention nor was 
as invested in resolving conflicts as 
the AU, but much can be attribut-
ed to the fundamental difference 
of non-intervention. The African 
Union’s revised structure bodes well 
for future action on preventing hu-
man rights abuses, but at this point 
in time, the AU does not have the 
capacity to succeed in interventions 
without assistance from the UN or 
other organizations.
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Crowded beaches in Rio de Janeiro, just a few months before COVID-19 arrived in Brazil. The gorgeous sunset re-
flects along the water with the Morro Dois Irmãos visible in the distance.
Photo by Gustavo Nativio, Class of 2023
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The Church of our Lady before Tyn is the most alluring and visually appealing part of the old town square, attract-
ing thousands of visitors each day. Photo taken at Old Town Square, Prague. 
Photo by Jordan Wade, Baylor University Class of 2022
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A view of Cape Town from the top of nearby Table Mountain, South Africa. Dark clouds encircle the mountaintop, 
but the city is still awash in sunlight. 
Photo by Jack O’Grady Class of 2022
